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Risk, Standard Deviation, and Expected Value:  
When Should an Individual Start Social Security? 
 Ted G. Eschenbach Neal A. Lewis 
 University of Alaska Anchorage Fairfield University 
Abstract 
In choosing when to start collecting social security, the differences in expected NPVs are 
small—but the corresponding standard deviations are not. Starting earlier is less risky. The case 
analyzed is single individuals in the U.S. system, but the methodology can be applied to couples 
and to the systems of other nations. Considering risk and return together places social security in 
the same risk/return framework as other capital investments. Behavioral, situational, and 
qualitative factors that often dominate decisions on when to start are linked with quantitative 
approaches to longevity risk and mortality risk. 
Defining the problem 
Social security is a U.S. government program providing retirement and other benefits to eligible 
people. The choice of when to begin retirement benefits is up to the individual, and much has 
been written about when to begin benefits. This work extends consideration of risk in the 
decision framework.  
The results presented here contribute to a specifically defined problem—when should a 
single, eligible individual with the required 40 U.S. Social Security “credits or quarters” start 
their retirement benefit. While benefits may begin in any given month, the exemplar choices are 
collecting reduced benefits as early as age 62, receiving a primary insurance amount (PIA) by 
waiting until full retirement age (the FRA is currently 66 with gradual increases beginning with 
those who turn 66 in 2021), or delaying up to age 70 for enhanced payments. No article can do 
more than contribute to an understanding of this problem and its solutions. There is too much 
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variety in individual situations and motivations, there are too many behavioral factors, there are 
both qualitative and quantitative aspects, and different types of risk are best measured 
differently. Examples are described as one of the limitations of this work.  
This work specifically addresses the problem of what can be learned by considering both 
expected values and standard deviations of incremental NPVs and IRRs. Previous work included 
expected values of retirement benefits based on mortality data, but not the corresponding 
standard deviations presented here. The large differences in standard deviations that are 
demonstrated are more important than smaller differences in expected values. This work also 
specifically addresses the problem of how to value social security benefits relative to other 
retirement funding sources—which are normally characterized by their expected value and 
standard deviation of historical or predicted annual returns. In contrast, the risks linked to social 
security are often described in qualitative terms only. Analyzing incremental IRRs provides two 
key results: (1) delaying benefits has negative expected IRRs and (2) delay has relatively large 
standard deviations. The results of this work were stable when analyzed for the mortality data of 
several demographic sub-groups that live longer or die sooner than average. 
At a broad definition of the problem, this work’s methodology can be applied to any 
nation’s pension or firm’s retirement system where the annual benefit received depends on the 
age at which the recipient chooses to start benefits. This application only depends on the 
individual having a choice and the analyst having the relevant mortality distribution(s) and 
program details. Applying the methodology does not depend on how a national pension system 
determines who is qualified nor on how benefit levels are calculated. Other national programs 
are summarized in Social Security Administration (2016, 2017a, 2017b, and 2018a), which are 
the most recent of the bi-annual updates for each of 4 world regions. While the work presented 
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here focuses on single individuals within the U.S. social security system, the methodology could 
be applied to those who are or were in a couple relationship where either partner is or will be 
eligible to receive benefits such as spousal or survivor’s benefits in the U.S. system or in the 
systems of other countries. 
Previous work 
System design and claimant behavior 
The Social Security Administration’s website (ssa.gov) and publications are the most 
authoritative source, but some of the clearest descriptions are found in material developed for 
potential claimants. The first step in computing benefits is the individual’s average indexed 
monthly earnings (AIME). This is based on the claimant’s highest 35 years of earnings (subject 
to social security withholding), adjusted for inflation and for the claimant’s social security (SS) 
income relative to average SS income in each year. In 2018 each $1320 of income subject to 
social security taxes earns 1 credit up to a maximum of 4 credits per year. If there are only the 
required 40 credits and they are concentrated in only 10 years, then 25 years of $0 are included 
in calculating AIME. The full retirement age monthly benefit (maximum $2,927 in 2018) known 
as the primary insurance amount (PIA) is computed from the maximum AIME of $9,936 (for 
2018). Equation 1 and Figure 1 show how PIA is calculated, using ‘bend points’ ($895 and 
$5,397) and multipliers (0.9, 0.32, and 0.15). If benefits start at age 62, benefits are reduced to 
75% of the PIA; if benefits are delayed until age 70, benefits are enhanced to 132% of the PIA. 
Each year the benefit received is adjusted for inflation and for any new income that increases the 
AIME. 





Figure 1. AIME to monthly PIA 
A majority of people start social security benefits at their earliest opportunity (Coile et al. 
2002; Knoll 2011; Muldoon and Kopcke 2008). For those 65 or older nearly 90% receive SS 
benefits (Social Security Administration 2018b). With 10,000 people now turning 65 every day 
(Cohn and Taylor 2010), this is a decision faced by many. 
Claiming benefits before full retirement age is less attractive for those with income subject 
to social security taxes. In the years before FRA, benefits are reduced by $1 for every $2 earned 
over $17,040 per year (for 2018). In the year a person reaches FRA, benefits are reduced by $1 
for every $3 earned over $45,360 (for 2018) in the months before FRA. The benefit reductions 
are delayed benefits and not lost benefits (though spousal benefits may be lost). If benefits start 
at or after FRA, then there are no income limits. 
As assumed here, previous work assumed that analysis of starting before FRA is warranted 
only if these income limits do not apply. Results are for a selected set of ages at death (Munnell 
and Soto 2005; Novack 2011) or for average or median life expectancies (Meyer and 

















security system was designed to be “benefit neutral” for single individuals. For these individuals 
with an average age at death the NPV of benefits is roughly the same no matter when benefits 
start (Cook, Jennings, and Reichenstein 2002; Jivan 2004; Sass, Sun, and Webb 2007).  
Limitations of previous work and this work 
Income taxes are not considered by this work as in most previous work; exceptions include 
Boskin et al. (1987) and Kotlikoff (1996). The challenges of considering income taxes include: 
(1) the proportion of social security benefits taxed is 0%, 50%, or 85% depending on income, (2) 
the marginal tax rate depends on total taxable income, (3) different states tax 0% to 100% of the 
benefits, and (4) individuals pay taxes at different rates over their time of receiving benefits. 
There are situations where federal income taxes provide an incentive to delay or start benefits. If 
income and tax rates are high now, but will drop significantly after the individual retires, then 
delay looks better. If income is low now and required minimum distributions will trigger higher 
tax rates, then starting early looks better. 
This work and much of the previous work considers only single individuals and does not 
include those who are or were in a couple relationship where either partner is or will be eligible 
to receive spousal or survivor’s benefits. These benefits are in addition to the retirement benefit 
of individuals (Lewis and Eschenbach 2013). Applying the methodology used here to couples 
would require considering the ages and PIAs of both partners and more complex strategies 
described in Reichenstein and Meyer (2017), which are beyond the scope of this work. 
Like previous work on recommended strategies, this work does not address provisions that 
may affect eligibility and the level of benefits. Examples of issues that are not addressed include 
the governmental pension offset (GPO), the windfall elimination provision (WEP), and 
consideration of military service.  
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Previous work has described mortality risk as the risk of collecting less (or nothing) if you 
die earlier than expected. Friedman and Phillips (2010) found that there are negative yields for 
many years from a one-year delay of benefits and that risk-averse people should start social 
security benefits as soon as income penalties end. The work presented here focuses on one 
measure of risk—the standard deviation of possible NPVs and IRRs. There are other measures, 
such as the semivariance, which only considers deviations below the average. While 
semivariance is not addressed further, it would emphasize that a delay in starting benefits would 
risk collecting little or nothing in the event of an early death. Opportunity loss (another measure 
of risk) has been used to calculate break-even ages at death (Alleva 2015).  
It has been argued in the popular press that starting benefits earlier reduces the risk of 
receiving less due to program changes. However when the value of benefits has been lowered in 
the past, “grandfathering” of current recipients and long periods before implementation have 
been common. For example, raising the full retirement age from 65 to 67 was discussed for 
years, signed into law in 1983 (Dewitt, 2010), first raised to 65 years and 2 months in 2000, and 
the last currently scheduled change to 67 occurs in 2022.  
This and previous work cannot judge the relative importance of behavioral, qualitative, and 
quantitative factors that may contribute to or dominate the choice of when to start benefits. This 
work can and does address the lesser importance of the expected value as compared with the 
standard deviation when considered together as quantitative measures for single individuals 
choosing a starting age.  
This work recognizes that individual decisions and more general recommendations require 
a more wholistic view. The proper balance of factors in a particular decision depends on 
individual situations and motivations. How much does a person may want to leave for heirs? 
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What is their risk attitude toward running out of money? How important are the expected value 
and standard deviation of the retirement benefit? While many decisions are made with 
incomplete knowledge and understanding, the authors assert that the following examples 
illustrate why many individuals start benefits at or before FRA. Claiming benefits earlier can (1) 
allow retirement and more time for desired activities; (2) support activities before health and 
vigor declines; (3) preserve money “in the bank” for events requiring a lump sum rather than a 
higher monthly benefit; (4) maximize benefits in the face of a terminal illness or life-shortening 
health problems; and (5) preserve current investments for bequests if the investments are not 
needed for later living expenses (Lockwood 2011). Ahn and Yoon (2011) describe an analogous 
tradeoff between labor, leisure, and investment. Claiming benefits later (1) is a form of required 
saving and (2) is a form of longevity insurance—which is addressed more fully in the next 
section.  
From a more academic perspective, it is suggested that (1) regret of possible losses is often 
larger than the value of similarly sized gains (Bell 1982); and (2) collecting social security is an 
annuity and like most economic goods it is subject to decreasing marginal utility (Kauder 1953). 
Thus collecting incrementally more annuity insurance from delaying benefits will have a lower 
marginal value than the basic benefit.  
Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) use heterogeneity in time preferences measured by 
discount rates to explain why individuals prefer to start benefits early.  Other work that focuses 
on including risk in a variety of contexts includes Gradl, et al. (2009), Ho and Pike (1998), and 





Longevity risk  
How does an individual support themselves if they live longer than expected? This longevity risk 
can be addressed with annuities that are priced for those that expect a disproportionately long 
life. Annuities are promoted as a hedge against longevity risk, but payouts average 81¢ per dollar 
invested (Mitchell et al. 1999) in contrast with the positive returns expected from investments. 
Another approach is to delay social security benefits to maximize the monthly payment (Sun and 
Webb 2009; Meyer and Reichenstein 2010). Delaying social security is a “free” annuity, because 
the expected values for different starting dates change so little (Sun and Webb 2011). If 
longevity risk is the dominant concern, then benefits should not be started until age 70. However, 
from early annuity work (Yaari 1965) it is usually assumed that the consumer has no bequest 
motive, and thus sees no value to wealth after death (Davidoff et al. 2005). In fact, most people 
do have a bequest motive; it is estimated that 75% of elderly single households want to leave a 
positive net worth estate for their heirs (Kopczuk and Lupton 2007).  
Manakyan et al. (2014) addressed longevity risk by simulating outcomes of starting 
benefits late vs. early and investing in portfolios ranging from all bonds to all stocks at survival 
ages of 86, 91, and 96. In most cases, claiming early and investing mainly in stocks was the best 
strategy. In contrast, Blanchett (2012) concluded starting benefits early and investing would earn 
9.15% less than delaying benefits for a hypothetical married couple. 
The analysis of longevity risk is complicated by the fact that there are behavioral answers 
to, “How does an individual support themselves if they live longer than expected?” For example, 
some retirees believe that moving in with family as health and assets decline is not just expected, 
but valued. As another example, claiming benefits earlier may be possible because near and 
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long-term behavior can be adjusted to match near and long-term income and expenditures. 
Travel or meals out can be adjusted as needed to be rare and cheap or common and expensive. 
The work presented here does not suggest that longevity risk can be ignored. However, 
balancing longevity risk with other factors requires consideration of bequest motives and 
possible behavioral changes. The authors assert the fundamental importance of recognizing that 
retirement benefits, even when started early, do address longevity risk. Delaying benefits simply 
gains incremental reductions in longevity risk.  
Assumptions  
Assumptions described previously include: a single individual starting benefits of 0.75×PIA at 
62, of 1×PIA at 66, or of 1.32×PIA at 70; results are pre-tax; and a PIA that equals the monthly 
maximum of $2927 (annual total = $35,124). Results for intermediate ages can be interpolated 
(though minor maximums can occur), and all results stated in dollars can be scaled to match any 
lower PIA. 
For ease of computation, we assume that the individual’s 62nd birthday is January 2nd so 
that the person will receive a full first year’s benefit (SSA, 2004). If a birthday of January 1st is 
assumed, then the bend points (see Equation 1) for the previous year must be used. Matching 
assumptions of end-of-year cash flows and end-of-year deaths are made in order to match the 
annual mortality data. Note that assuming mid-year or monthly cash flows would increase the 
economic value of benefits by a factor of about 1 + i/2 (where i is the real interest rate), thus 
relative and incremental expected values will not change. Standard deviations will simply 
increase by the multiplicative factor, which is close to 1 so relative values will change little. 
Conditional probabilities regarding age at death assume a person is alive at 62, and are 
calculated using current mortality data (2014) from the National Vital Statistics System (Arias, 
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2017). If similarly reliable monthly data were available or deaths were assumed to be mid-year, 
then the final year of benefits would be approximately halved. This does decrease the economic 
value of the benefit stream, so this is an assumption that is an opportunity for further research.  
Because social security benefits do receive cost of living adjustments, all benefits are stated 
in constant value dollars. A real interest rate of 3% is assumed for most computations, as that has 
been commonly used in the literature and by the Social Security Administration (Cook, Jennings, 
and Reichenstein 2002; Munnell and Soto 2005; Sass, Sun, and Webb 2008).  
For descriptive purposes, the first results presented are for the net present value of benefits 
at starting ages of 62, 66, and 70. This also supports a very important point. These results cannot 
be used to calculate the standard deviation of incremental benefits, as that would incorrectly 
assume independent, identically distributed random variables for age at death for each starting 
age. Instead, the correct assumption is to assume a single random variable for age at death and 
then calculate the incremental NPVs or IRRs. This is analogous to a paired difference model.  
Expected NPV and risk 
Equation 1 defines the annual benefit (APIA) that is received from the age at start (s) until the 
age at death (d). Equation 2 details the calculation of the benefit stream’s NPV. Because of 
annual compounding, benefits are considered at the end of the year received, so benefits received 
during age 62 are identified as year 63. Thus, age 62 is time 0, and 63 is the end of period 1. 
Table 1 shows example conditional probabilities for age at death given that a person is alive at 
62, derived from the NVSS data (Arias, 2017). In particular, note that the probability of dying 
before collecting (shown in Table 2) is 4.48% for starting benefits at age 66 (= 0.0103 + 0.0109 
+ 0.0115 + 0.0121 from Table 1). Similarly, the probability of dying before age 70 (assuming 
being alive at 62) is 10.12%. 
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    for 𝑑 = [63,101] (3) 
 
 
Table 1. Example conditional dying probabilities given alive at 62 derived from NVSS data for 









63 0.0103  94 0.0318 
64 0.0109  95 0.0284 
65 0.0115  96 0.0246 
66 0.0121  97 0.0208 
67 0.0128  98 0.0171 
68 0.0136  99 0.0136 
69 0.0145  100 0.0105 
70 0.0155  ≥101 0.0242 
 
Figure 2 is the basis of the first major conclusion. For single individuals, differences in 
standard deviation are much larger and thus more important than the much smaller differences in 
expected value for different starting ages. Recall that the preferred direction on the return (or y-
axis) is up and on the standard deviation (or x-axis) is to the left. Figure 2 shows that at a 3% real 
interest rate the expected values (measured on the y-axis) are virtually equivalent for each 
starting age, but the standard deviations are not. Only at 0% do we see the “normal” tradeoff 
between risk and return where expecting a higher return is paired with a higher risk. Again, small 
increases in NPV are paired with large increases in risk. At a 6% real interest rate, starting as 
early as possible is a dominant strategy considering these two measures with higher expected 
returns and lower risks. 
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Figure 2. NPV’s risk and expected return for total population for starting ages of 62, 66, and 70 
at real interest rates of 0%, 3%, and 6%. 
 
Table 2 details the descriptive statistics for this data. If this were to be used to calculate 
the incremental difference between starting at 62 and 66, the expected value difference of $5821 
(= 390,531 – 384,710) would be correct. However, it would be wrong to calculate the standard 
deviation of the difference as $215,403 = √131,2272 + 170,1862  because the variables are 
not independent. The next section presents results for this work’s assumption of a single 
conditional probability distribution for each class of individuals. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the NPV of benefits at 3% real interest. 
 Start 62 Start 66 Start 70 
Expected NPV $384,710 $390,531 $379,019 
Std. dev. $131,227 $170,186 $205,574 
P(die before start) 0 4.48% 10.12% 
 
Incremental NPV 
Calculating incremental NPVs for each year of death is simply the difference between two 
applications of Equations 2 and 3—an earlier start at 62 or 66 and a later start at 66 or 70. Unlike 
the mortality distributions which depend on gender, the NPV calculations do not. Thus, there is 
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only one set of ∆NPVs for each incremental comparison. The increment order is chosen to match 
the normal engineering economic incremental assumption that each increment is an investment. 
In this case, the investment is forgoing earlier year payments to qualify for larger payments in 
later years. The results in Table 3 are for the maximum PIA, but they can be scaled for any other 
PIA value. 
Table 3. Incremental NPVs at 3% real interest. 
Die at ∆NPV66 − 62 ∆NPV70 − 66 Die at ∆NPV66 − 62 ∆NPV70 − 66 
63 −$24,361 $0 94 $46,172 $32,627 
64 −$48,013 $0 95 $49,326 $36,663 
65 −$70,976 $0 96 $52,387 $40,582 
66 −$93,269 $0 97 $55,360 $44,386 
67 −$86,055 −$28,859 98 $58,246 $48,080 
68 −$79,050 −$56,878 99 $61,048 $51,666 
69 −$72,249 −$84,081 100 $63,768 $55,148 
70 −$65,647 −$110,492 ≥101 $66,409 $58,528 
 
Table 4 summarizes the results for the total population and by gender by applying each 
category’s conditional probabilities. Delaying from 66 to 70 results in a negative E(∆NPV) in all 
of these cases. Delaying from 62 to 66 results in either negative or significantly smaller 
E(∆NPV) than the corresponding standard deviations. Note that the standard deviations, while 
large compared to the expected values, are substantially smaller than the $215,403 that was 
calculated for hypothetical independent probability distributions. 
 
Table 4. Summary statistics for incremental NPV at 3% real interest. 
 Total population Female Male 
 66 − 62 70 − 66 66 − 62 70 − 66 66 − 62 70 − 66 
E(∆NPV) $5,821 −$11,512 $11,169 −$6,299 −$185 −$17,431 
Std. dev. $40,004 $42,533 $38,994 $42,176 $40,078 $41,951 




It is these results that specifically address the problem of what can be learned by 
considering both expected values and standard deviations of incremental NPVs. The larger 
differences in standard deviations that are demonstrated are more important than smaller 
differences in expected values. These results contribute to the solution of when a single 
individual should start social security.  
Incremental rate of return 
This section addresses the problem of how to value social security benefits relative to other 
retirement funding sources—which are normally characterized by the expected value and 
standard deviation of historical or predicted annual returns. Analyzing incremental IRRs 
provides two key results: (1) delaying benefits has negative expected IRRs and (2) delay has 
relatively large standard deviations. Delaying benefits results in both lower expected returns and 
higher standard deviations than for other retirement investments. 
The higher risk of social security is particularly notable because the older an individual, the 
more conservative the recommended investment portfolio becomes. Bear markets (time periods 
where stock prices are decreasing) are part of the volatility of long-term investing; however, a 
bear market just before or during retirement can shrink portfolios below what is needed for a 
retiree’s well-made plan. At the average age at death, delaying starting benefits is similar to 
living in a bear market during much of retirement. 
Because incremental IRR analysis is based on cash flows, it is easiest to use the PIA 
multipliers of 75%, 100%, and 132% for starting at 62, 66, and 70 respectively. Starting benefits 
at age 66 (= time 0) means forgoing the 75% benefit that could have been received at 63, 64, 65, 
and 66. Instead, 25% more is received from 67 until death. Similarly waiting until age 70 instead 
of starting at 66 means forgoing the 100% that could have been received at 67, 68, 69, and 70. 
15 
 
Instead 32% more is received from 71 until death. 
Equations 4 and 5 are solved to find the incremental IRRs if death occurs after positive 
incremental benefits are started. If death occurs before the delayed benefits are started, then the 
∆IRR cannot be calculated; however, this is conceptually a complete “loss of investment” or 
complete “loss of the opportunity to receive benefits” or a −100% incremental IRR. Again, 
benefits are considered at the end of the year received, so benefits qualified for at a time 0 of age 
62 are identified as year 63. Note that representative values shown in Table 5 do not depend on 
any mortality distribution.  










  for 𝑑 ≥ 67 (4) 










  for 𝑑 ≥ 71 (5) 
 
 
Table 5. Incremental IRRs. 
Die at ∆IRR66 − 62 ∆IRR70 − 66 Die at ∆IRR66 − 62 ∆IRR70 − 66 
63 −100% - 94 6.2% 5.2% 
64 −100% - 95 6.3% 5.4% 
65 −100% - 96 6.4% 5.6% 
66 −100% - 97 6.5% 5.7% 
67 −74.9% −100% 98 6.6% 5.8% 
68 −48.6% −100% 99 6.6% 6.0% 
69 −33.6% −100% 100 6.7% 6.1% 
70 −24.0% −100% ≥101 6.8% 6.2% 
 
Figure 3 graphs the incremental IRR vs. age at death. This emphasizes that if an individual 
dies within 16 years of making the decision to delay (age 78 for delaying from 62 to 66, and 82.5 
for delaying from 66 to 70) delay has a negative incremental IRR—often extremely negative. On 
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the other hand, living into your 90’s only earns positive incremental rates of return of about 5% 
to 7% (see also Friedman and Phillips 2010). A real interest rate of 3% was used as the MARR 
for NPV calculations, and it can be used as a hurdle rate for the IRR. Delaying from age 62 to 66 
achieves a 3% IRR at age 81.0 (when the general population has a 40.0% probability of being 
deceased), and delaying from 66 to 70 achieves a 3% IRR at age 85.8 (with a 59.3% probability 
of being deceased). 
Figure 3. Incremental IRR vs. age at death. 
Figure 3 also includes the expected IRR for both genders and both incremental choices 
plotted at the expected ages at death. Because these values do depend on the mortality 
distributions, it should be noted that the probabilities used for ∆IRR70−66 are age at death given 
alive at 66 rather than the given alive at 62 used previously. Table 6 details the expected return 
and standard deviations for the incremental IRRs. 
Table 6. Summary statistics for incremental IRR. 
 Total Female Male 
 66 − 62 70 − 66 66 − 62 70 − 66 66 − 62 70 − 66 
E(∆IRR) −6.65% −11.00% −2.43% −6.22% −4.45% −8.48% 






















• E(∆IRR66 − 62 |Male)
 E(∆IRR70 − 66 |Male)
o E(∆IRR66 − 62 |Female)





Impact of race, individual health, and heredity 
The prior analysis has focused on mortality risk for an “average” individual, male or female. 
Decision-making by individuals can consider more specific indicators such as likely life span. 
There are lifestyle choices (tobacco, drugs, exercise, etc.) and family histories that can shift the 
mortality expectation for an individual. These differences are difficult to characterize, but 
mortality distributions for demographic sub-populations can be used for insight into how 
incremental NPV and IRR results shift with the mortality distributions of individuals. There are 
groups with shifted mortality curves from the population at large. As shown in Figure 4, black 
males have a mortality curve that is shifted towards earlier death, and Hispanic females have a 
mortality curve that is shifted towards later death, all given that the person is alive at 62. Thus, 
they represent somewhat lower and higher life spans. The difference in their median age at death 
is 8.15 years. Use of this data was prompted by Docking, Fortin, and Michelson (2011), which 
also included the use of incremental IRRs. 
 













































Table 7 summarizes the results for incremental NPV analyses for the total population and 4 
sub-populations. Most of the expected incremental NPVs are negative. The four that are positive 
have large coefficients of variation ranging from 1.93 to 13.13. The results for black males have 
more negative expected values than all males and slightly larger standard deviations. Only for 
Hispanic females does the E(∆NPV) exceed half of the standard deviation. 
Table 7. NPV results for different mortality curves. 
 
Delay from 62 to 66 Delay from 66 to 70 
Group   E(∆NPV)  σ   CV   E(∆NPV) σ   CV 
Black Male −$8,947 $41,924 −4.85 −$23,984 $43,095 −1.80 
Male −$185 $40,078 −216.77 −$17,431 $41,951 −2.41 
Total $5,821 $40,004 6.87 −$11,512 $42,533 −3.69 
Female $11,169 $38,994 3.49 −$6,299 $42,176 −6.70 
Hispanic Female $19,696 $38,018 1.93 $3,179 $41,737 13.13 
Table 8 summarizes the incremental IRRs for the total population and 4 sub-populations. 
All of the expected incremental IRRs are negative, all of the standard deviations are large, and 
the coefficients of variation range from −2.06 to −51.68. The smallest standard deviation is 
19.3% (for Hispanic females, when delaying from 62 to 66). None of the delay strategies is 
attractive for any of the groups. Raising the median age at death to nearly 89 (Hispanic females) 
or lowering it to 80 (Black males) does not change the conclusion. 
 
Table 8. Incremental IRRs for different mortality curves. 
 
Delay from 62 to 66 Delay from 66 to 70 
Group   EV σ   CV   EV σ   CV 
Black Male −11.5% 31.0% −2.70 −16.1% 33.1% −2.06 
Male −6.6% 26.5% −3.99 −11.0% 29.1% −2.65 
Total −4.5% 24.2% −5.44 −8.5% 27.0% −3.19 
Female −2.4% 21.7% −8.92 −6.2% 24.8% −3.99 




The conclusion that smaller differences in expected value are less important than larger 
differences in risk seems to be robust. In addition, when considering individual circumstances, 
health and longevity issues are more likely to be identified in the short-term than in a possible 
future that is 30 years or more away.  
Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Work  
Expected values and standard deviations have long been used together to evaluate investments, 
capital projects, and alternative engineering design choices—but not when to start collecting 
social security benefits. This work adds consideration of the standard deviations of ∆NPVs and 
∆IRRs for evaluating when to start collecting U.S. social security benefits for single individuals. 
• As confirmed in this work, previous work has shown that expected NPV values for 
different starting ages are similar. Thus, ∆NPVs for delay are small. In contrast, the 
standard deviations presented here are larger with coefficients of variation ranging 
from 1.93 to 13.31 for ∆NPVs that are positive. If the ∆NPVs are negative, then any 
level of risk indicates that delay is a dominated alternative when evaluated by these 
two criteria. 
• ∆IRRs have been previously presented for delaying benefits, but without calculating 
standard deviations. By these measures starting early is clearly better. Expected 
∆IRRs for 5 mortality distributions are all negative—ranging from −3.3% to 
−16.1%. The standard deviations are large—ranging from 19.3% to 33.1%. 
• For ages before the full retirement age, the expected values and standard deviations 
do not imply that someone should retire in order to begin collecting. The income 
from working is very likely to exceed social security benefits.  
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• Social security may be the only source of retirement income, or it may be part of an 
individual’s retirement planning that includes an investment portfolio composed of 
assets, such as stocks, bonds, and Treasury bills. Historical and projected 
performance of such assets is most commonly measured by expected returns and 
the standard deviations of return. Knowing the ∆IRRs expected return and standard 
deviation for social security decisions is a starting point in considering social 
security as part of an investment portfolio.  
• While differences in risk are greater than differences in expected return, these 
quantitative results must be considered in a broader framework. This work has 
described some of the most important behavioral and qualitative factors that may 
contribute to or dominate the choice of when to start benefits. Only individuals 
know their situation and their motivations.  
• It is fundamentally important to recognize that retirement benefits, even when 
started early, address longevity risk. Delaying benefits gains incremental reductions 
in longevity risk while incrementally increasing mortality risk. 
• Because this work is about decision-making by individuals, a key question is how 
much are the results influenced by mortality distributions shifted to earlier or later 
death. Such shifts are an important part of the behavioral and qualitative factors that 
must be considered. Some level of individual differences corresponds with 
differences in mortality distributions for gender and racial subgroups. At least at 
this level of difference, the results for expected values and standard deviation were 
consistent with results for females, males, and the total population. 
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• The insight that standard deviations can be calculated using the same data used for 
expected total benefits and considered together with the expected values can be 
applied to other applications of mortality distributions. However, it is necessary to 
calculate ∆NPVs and ∆IRRs before a mortality distribution for age at death is 
applied to calculate expected values and standard deviations. Applying the mortality 
distribution to each starting choice independently is only of descriptive 
importance—not a valid way to calculate standard deviations of incremental 
choices. 
Some of the following suggestions for further work are straightforward to execute while 
others are likely to be very challenging. To some extent, the suggestions are ordered by the 
expected level of difficulty. These are presented as examples—not as a comprehensive set. 
• Consider single individuals under the retirement system of another country that 
allows individuals to choose when to start receiving benefits and where those 
benefits depend on when they start. The rules, available choices, the mortality 
distributions, the expected values, the standard deviations, etc. may all be 
different—but the methodology should be applicable.  
• Consider choices for couples who are or were in a relationship where benefits such 
as the U.S. SSA’s spousal and survivor’s benefits are available. For example, in the 
U.S. after 9 months of marriage a new spouse can qualify for survivor’s benefits 
and after 1 year for spousal benefits. After 10 years of marriage a divorced spouse 
can claim spousal or survivor’s benefits if unmarried and 62. Because of the 
complexity of potential strategies and the myriad combinations of ages and SS 
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earnings, it is suggested that special cases such as spouses with the same age be 
analyzed first.  
• An assumption of independent mortality distributions is a likely starting point for 
analysis of choices for couples. However, there is evidence that the distributions are 
not independent. Most clearly, both partners may die with a common cause such as 
an auto accident. Even without a common cause there is some level of correlation. 
Nevertheless, computing incremental differences between choices before 
calculating expected values and standard deviations seems necessary. 
• Portfolio theory is well developed for financial assets, but the right to receive 
benefits from social security is a completely different type of asset with a mortality 
distribution rather than market performance as the driver of uncertainty. Is there a 
way to integrate these or at least consider both when making choices in both? For 
example, being qualified for a higher social security benefit might imply that a 
higher level of financial risk would be acceptable. This is of particular interest 
because a common investment guideline is that exposure to more volatile assets 
such as stocks should shrink as age increases. 
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